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LABOR LAW -ARBITRATION - RESTRICTION OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN· 
To THE ARBITRATION PROCESS - Respondent company laid off a number of 
employees as a result of its decision to contract out maintenance work form-
erly done in the company shop. After the grievance procedure failed to 
resolve petitioner union's claim that this violated the contract provision 
against lockouts, and the company refused the union's request for arbitra-
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tion, the union sought specific performance of the promise to arbitrate 
contained in the collective bargaining contract. In dismissing the plea, the 
district court found that contracting out work was solely a function of man-
agement and therefore not arbitrable because the contract specifically 
excluded from arbitration "matters which are strictly a function of man-
agement."1 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the 
same ground.2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, 
reversed, one Justice dissenting.s An order to arbitrate should not be denied 
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause can 
not to be interpreted to cover the asserted dispute. United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
In 1957 the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills4 interpreted section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act:. in a manner 
which gave federal courts a right to form a federal substantive labor law. 
Since this time the federal courts have heard a number of suits seeking 
specific performance of the contract agreement to arbitrate. These cases 
draw into question the jurisdiction of the arbitrator over the alleged griev-
ance and require the court to determine whether the defendant promised 
to arbitrate the particular grievance.6 The general rule in the lower fed-
eral courts has been that the further question, which party is right on the 
merits of the grievance, is for the arbitrator, and not the court, to decide.7 
However, in denying arbitration of grievances because they were found to be 
frivolous on the merits or in deciding the question of the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction where the same contract interpretation will resolve both this 
question and the question on the merits, the court may in effect deny arbi-
tration upon its own conclusion concerning the merits of the grievance.8 
Similar intervention may occur in a court's review of arbitration awards 
to determine whether the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in making 
the award.9 On the other hand, the legal writers have almost uniformly 
1 United Steelworkers v. Warrior 8: Gulf Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 702, 705 (S.D. 
Ala. 1958). 
2 United Steelworkers v. Warrior 8: Gulf Navigation Co., 269 F .2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959). 
s In dissent Justice Whittaker argued that the Court could not order arbitration where 
the parties did not manifest by plain language an intent to arbitrate the particular 
grievance. He also found a practical construction of the contract by the parties that 
contracting out was strictly a management function. Justices Brennan, Harlan, and 
Frankfurter, concurring, indicate that the federal courts could inquire more deeply into 
the circumstances and refuse arbitration upon a less conclusive showing by the defendant 
where the presence of a restrictive arbitration clause and specific exclusions from arbitra• 
tion display the parties' "interest in confining" the arbitrator. 
4 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
5 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958). 
o Principal case at 582. 
7 See, e.g., New Bedford Defense Products v. Local 1113, UAW-CIO, 258 F.2d 522 
(1st Cir. 1958). See also Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 
RoCKY MT. L. REv. 247, 258 (1958). 
8 See, e.g., Local 149, Am. Fed'n Technical Eng'rs v. General Electric Co., 250 F .2d 
922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958). 
9 See Enterprise Wheel 8: Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959). 
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asserted the uniqueness of the collective bargaining contract and the in-
eptitude of the ordinary judge in dealing with it.10 Because it is designed 
to cover a myriad of occurrences and is written to be understood by the 
union rank and file, the contract is but a skeleton which can best be in-
terpreted by one who is familiar with industrial practice.11 In harmony with 
these ideas the Court in the principal case and its two companion cases, 
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.12 and United Steelworkers 
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,13 has restricted the opportunity for judicial 
intervention into the merits of the grievance or the propriety of the arbitra-
tor's award while deciding the question of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.14 
In American Mfg. Co.1 5 the Court held that arbitration cannot be denied 
merely because a court thinks the grievance itself has no reasonable basis. 
Unfounded grievances, which are occasionally brought by the union either 
for tactical purposes or to satisfy the demands of rank and file members,1 6 
may now reach arbitration in increased numbers. However, there seems to 
be little inducement to bring additional baseless grievances. Since by 
hypothesis such claims would be unfounded, the union could expect only 
unfavorable decisions. The only harassment value then would lie in the 
time and money spent by the employer in his defense; but similar costs 
would also be incurred by the union.11 
In the principal case and in Enterprise it appears that the rules promul-
gated to restrict judicial intervention are of an evidential nature. Prior to 
the principal case, the plaintiff seeking specific performance of a promise to 
arbitrate had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant 
had promised to arbitrate the particular grievance.18 However, according 
10 A leading example is Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 2 BUFFALO 
L. REv. 1 (1952). 
11 For a recent expression of such views, see Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 
72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959). 
12 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
13 363 U .s. 593 (1960). 
14 For two instances in which the impact of the three cases has been felt, sec Maryland 
Tel. Union v. Chesapeake &: Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960); 
Local 725, Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 186 F. Supp. 895 
(D.N.D. 1960). 
15 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The union sought arbitration of an employee's right to return 
to a job which required him to lift heavy objects. He had been released after an accident 
and settlement of his workmen's compensation claim in which his doctor alleged he 
had sustained a permanent, 25% disability of the spine. The court of appeals found the 
grievance was encompassed by the arbitration clause but denied arbitration because the 
grievance was "frivolous." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624 (6th 
Cir. 1959). 
16 Unions occasionally bring "political" grievances; see DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 316 (1951). 
17 It appears that the parties normally pay their own expenses but occasionally the 
loser pays all. Kruger, Arbitration and Its Uses in 36 Firms in Wisconsin, 6 LAn. L.J. 165, 
172 (1955). 
18 Sec WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485, 2537 (3d ed. 1940); BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PRO· 
CEDURE § 2-03 (1955). However, at least one court of appeals appears to have created a 
burden similar to that in the principal case. Local 1912, 1AM v. United States Potash Co., 
270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 845 (1960), 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 935 (1960). 
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to the principal case, a federal court must now have "positive assurance" 
shown by the "most forceful evidence"19 that the promise to arbitrate can 
not be interpreted to encompass the ·particular grievance before it can 
deny arbitration. While the decision does not affect the burden of proof 
in the usual case in which the question of his own jurisdiction is also sub-
mitted to the arbitrator,20 it may be argued that the courts, in the cases 
submitted to them, will force defendant into arbitration without finding 
that he in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular grievance.21 However, 
simply because the party seeking arbitration has a lighter burden of proof, 
it should not be said that the courts will now not decide the question of 
agreement.22 Rather, the procedural requirements for establishing any 
claim can properly vary with policy considerations.23 Here the policy in 
favor of settlement of labor disputes by arbitration supports the lesser bur-
den on the plaintiff seeking to prove that the defendant promised to arbi-
trate the particular grievance.24 Future federal court interpretations of 
agreements to arbitrate may well come closer to the parties' intent than 
those former decisions which displayed the full effect of judicial hostility 
to arbitration.211 
In the Enterprise case the arbitrator reinstated several workers after the 
collective bargaining contract had expired and in spite of the fact that 
there was then no contractual bar to their discharge. The company re-
sisted the union's action to enforce the arbitrator's award on the ground that 
the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction in making the award. Because 
of an ambiguity in the opinion accompanying the award it could have 
reasonably been inferred either that the arbitrator properly based his award 
upon his construction of the contract or that he improperly founded the 
result solely upon his interpretation of enacted legislation. By inferring that 
the arbitrator acted within his authority when his opinion was ambiguous 
on that point, the Court holds in effect that the party urging the vacation of 
the award has the burden of proving the arbitrator's excess. Because of this 
burden and the language in the case indicating that the arbitrator need not 
give reasons for his award, it might be argued that the arbitrator, behind 
19 Principal case at 582-85. 
20 Although some arbitrators deny that a "burden of proof" rests on either party in 
arbitration, most arbitrators apply burdens similar to those in court. Upon whom the 
burden rests depends greatly upon the circumstances of the grievance, but generally it is 
said to rest upon the party seeking to prove the affirmative. See Gorske, Burden of Proof in 
Grievance Arbitration, 43 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 135 (1959). 
21 See Note, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 935 (1960), where this fear is expressed about a similar 
case. 
22 If there is "most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitra-
tion," the court may deny arbitration, even in the absence of an express contractual 
denial. Principal case at 585. 
23 McCormick indicates several factors which may govern the placing and weight of 
the burden of proof. McCoR!IUCK, EVIDENCE §§ 309, 318 (1954). 
24 Congress has expressed approval of labor arbitration. 61 Stat. 152, 154 (1947), 29 
U.S.C. §§ I71 (c), 173 (d) (1958). 
25 See Judge Frank's discussion of the history and nature of this hostility in Kulu-
kundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 1942). 
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the shield of an ambiguous opinion, can now make awards in excess of 
his jurisdiction without fear of judicial review.26 However, a similar, 
though perhaps lighter, burden has long rested on the party seeking to 
vacate a commercial arbitration award without evident adverse effect upon 
the process.27 Moreover, the diligence ·with which the federal courts en-
force these restrictions upon judicial intervention may well vary with the 
abuses of the arbitration process. Also, judicial review may prove unnec-
essary in this area to avoid excesses because of the parties' internal controls 
upon the arbitration process. Neither party will accept an arbitrator who 
in his previous decisions has proved untrustworthy.2s Finally, the Court 
has indicated that the arbitrator's actions may be limited by specific con-
tractual provisions.29 Although the union will generally desire the widest 
discretion in the arbitrator, the risk of a complete management rejection 
of arbitration may compel union agreement to clearly-defined limits on the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction.so 
In addition to its impact upon the arbitration process, the Warrior & 
Gulf case appears to make serious inroads upon the idea that management 
has certain exclusive prerogatives. The Court's statement that where the 
contract contains a no-strike clause "everything that management does is 
subject to the agreement"81 and its suggestion that restrictions upon man-
agement rights can properly be implied from the contract seem to jeopardize 
the traditional management view that it retains rights unless express re-
strictions in the contract provide to the contrary.32 However, since only 
the question of the arbitrability of a contracting-out grievance was con-
26 For the standard grounds for judicial review and an indication of the common law 
confusion here, see Jones, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. I (1957). 
27See American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d 
Cir. 1944); Jacob v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 136 Ore. 622, 297 Pac. 848 (1931). 
28 It seems likely that the parties give close study to the previous awards indexed ac-
cording to arbitrator in the Labor Arbitration Reports. This power of choice may be less 
helpful to small unions and companies who may be limited by cost alone to inferior 
arbitrators. 
29 When the "arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation" to draw 
the "essence" of the award from the "collective bargaining agreement," the courts can 
properly refuse enforcement of the award. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). It seems that Professor Hays gives an unduly 
restrictive meaning to this language in his suggestion that now a court may not overturn 
an award which contradicts an express term of the contract if only the arbitrator says 
that the award is based upon his interpretation of the contract. Hays, Supreme Court 
and Labor Law October Term 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 929 (1960). 
30 If one party has a very strong bargaining position, he could attempt to prevent 
the application of the evidential rules of Warrior or Enterprise by a contract stipulation 
that normal standards of proof should apply. It is conceivable that in this situation the 
courts would find the policy in support of arbitration strong enough to override such a 
stipulation although the result would probably be couched in terms of the parties' in-
ability to control court procedure by contract. 
31 Principal case at 583. 
32 For the competing views on the present status of these prerogatives, see Phelps, 
Management's Reserved Rights: An Industry View and Goldberg, Management's Rescroed 
Rights: A Labor View, both in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS & THE ARBITRATION Pn.ocESS, at 102 and 
IIS (1956). 
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sidered by the Court, it seems unlikely that the restrictive definition here 
placed upon "management functions" will be extended to other situations, 
for the policy favoring arbitration of grievances does not also require that 
labor be given additional substantive rights once the actual arbitration has 
begun.33 
James ]. White 
33 Cf. principal case at 583-84. 
